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1. RICHARD OSBORNE, ‘AT THE SIGN OF THE SWINGIN’ SYMBOL: THE MANIPULATION 
OF THE UK SINGLES CHART’ 
 
Entering the chart 
What has been the purpose of the singles chart? Ostensibly it has reflected the 
popularity of music, but really it has driven it. To enter to the Top 40 has been to access 
a new promotional world: there have been Top 40 broadcasters, Top 40 retailers and 
Top 40 music journals. As Martin Parker has stated, a good position in the singles chart 
will ‘amplify success as well as quantifying and advertising it’ (1991: 208). The chart is 
as an echo chamber that resounds loudest at the top. 
 But what is it advertising? Singles promote themselves, yet they are just as likely 
to be promoting something else. They have been used as loss leaders for albums and 
they have provided an effective means of introducing the public to nascent acts. Their 
currency is newness. To this end, the popularity of a single has to be marshaled. The 
record business has desired that they generate the right publicity for the right product 
at the right time. Hence, if the singles chart is not working in their interests they will 
exploit and manipulate the statistical variables in the way it is compiled.  
These variables are the subject of this chapter. I will address who is responsible 
for compiling the singles chart, the breadth of the survey, the representation of the 
results, the frequency of the chart and how a ‘single’ is defined. I will do so through the 
lens of the singles chart in Britain, but by way of comparison I will also address charts in 
the US. Britain has been chosen because it is a country where the singles chart has been 
particularly central to musical life. This has been attributed both to the national 
character and to the political economy of its media and music industries. In turn, this 
centrality has caused fears within these industries that the chart can be ‘broken’. The 
concern moves in cycles. It can be prompted by anxiety that the chart has been 
manipulated too much; therefore it no longer represents the public’s taste and will not 
garner their attention. On other occasions it will arise because the public’s taste is 
considered boring and is not serving the interests of the industries; therefore the chart 
needs to be manipulated to make it serviceable again. The effects of digital technologies 
have been felt keenly. The inclusion of data from downloads and streaming has 
transformed the construction and conceptualization of the chart. The great quandary 
for British music businesses is whether it has overturned its importance.  
 
Who is doing the counting? 
The UK singles chart and the US charts both have their roots in the entertainment press. 
The American charts were launched in trade papers such as Variety and Billboard, while 
the British chart arrived in journals aimed at the public. The New Musical Express (NME) 
issued the first chart based on singles sales in November 1952, followed by similar 
charts in the Record Mirror (1954) and Melody Maker (1956). The impetus was financial 
and promotional. Percy Dickens created the NME chart in the hope it would provide 
record companies with a tool to advertise in his publication. He was successful too. The 
first number one was Al Martino’s ‘Here in My Heart’. Within weeks it was being 
advertised by Capitol Records as a chart topping single (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 2012). 
 The British trade journal Record Retailer launched its own chart in 1960, which 
has subsequently been used for historical chart data. Nonetheless, there continued to be 
a number of rival charts in the UK until 1969, when the British Market Research Bureau 
(BMRB), funded by Record Retailer, initiated a unified singles chart. Thereafter, this 
chart has been compiled by a variety of research organizations, funded in various forms 
of partnership by Music Week (the successor to Record Retailer), the BBC, retailers 
associations and/or the British Phonographic Industry (BPI). BPI is the trade 
association for the UK recording industry. While it is possible for most British labels to 
become members, it has been viewed as being dominated by the multi-national major 
companies (Cloonan 2007: 49). Since 2001, the chart has been the responsibility of The 
Official Charts Company, an organization that is funded by BPI and the Entertainment 
Retailers Association (ERA). The UK singles chart has never been independent of 
industry interests.  
 
How wide is the survey? 
The first American record charts were introduced in Variety in the late 1930s. They 
concerned jukebox popularity. Jukeboxes were useful for statistical purposes as they 
tabulated each time a record was played. A ‘Top 40’ was chosen because this was the 
standard number of discs in a machine (Brewster and Broughton 2006: 58). The earliest 
British record charts, in contrast, were concerned with sales and their statistical basis 
was less systematic. Although it was billed as the first ‘authentic weekly survey of the 
best-selling “pop” records’, the original NME chart was compiled loosely, arrived at by 
asking a mere 25 retailers what records had been selling (Anon. 1952: 8). The breadth 
of the surveys had expanded by the mid-1960s, by which time the Melody Maker was 
targeting 250 ‘chart return’ shops to gain their data (Leslie 1965: 50). The rigour of 
these surveys remained questionable, however. Writing in this period, Peter Leslie 
noted: 
 
Although the integrity of those who compile the charts from the returned 
questionnaires (about 50 per cent only) is beyond question, the data on the 
questionnaires must be suspect: no figures of actual sales are given, only the 
order of customers’ preference – and the compiler has no way whatever of 
telling if the person who filled in the form was accurate or not. (1965: 50-51) 
 
It was not long before suppliers were falsifying data or having it falsified for them. The 
return shops remained limited in number: after it was taken over by BMRB, the survey 
still addressed only seven per cent of record retailers (Hunter 1971: 11). Their identity 
was an open secret and they were therefore an easy target, falling prey to record 
companies, managers and agents, whose practice of chart ‘hyping’ was widespread and 
has since been openly admitted. As an example, Dave Arden, the son of manager Don 
Arden, has detailed how his father would employ agents to work upon chart return 
stores, getting them to elevate the sales figures of his own charges and decrease the 
popularity of his rivals (Rye 2017: 32-3). The bribes offered to record retailers took a 
number of forms, including money, gifts and free stock. Another method of 
manipulation was for the record companies to buy their own records. They would pay 
consumers to visit chart return shops and purchase copies of their singles.  
It has been claimed that it was only possible to hype a record into the lower 
reaches of the charts. Radio producer Phil Swaren has stated, ‘I don’t think that many 
records became massive hits because of manipulation. I do believe that if the public 
didn’t like a record they wouldn’t buy it, no matter what you did’ (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 
2012). The response of the chart hypers, however, is that they deliberately limited their 
activity. According to Arden, ‘The old man was very careful, he always knew there’s only 
so far you can push something, and then it’s got to have its own legs and then he also 
didn’t want people thinking it was being hyped’ (Rye 2017: 32). Furthermore, by 
reaching the lower rungs of the charts, key promotional benefits would already have 
been gained. As Swaren states, ‘a record going in the charts at number 39 and the radio 
stations would suddenly take a bit more interest in it and therefore might begin to play 
it’ (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 2012). 
 By the early 1980s it was believed that the chart was ‘clogged up with hyped 
records’ (The Chart Busters 1980). This situation resulted in investigations by the Daily 
Mirror and the television programme World in Action. BPI countered that there was ‘no 
widespread hyping’ (ibid.). They also maintained there was nothing wrong with the fact 
that they were responsible for policing the chart and therefore the record industry in 
effect ‘sat in judgement on themselves’ (ibid.). In 1987, the BMRB’s successor, the Gallup 
Organization, widened the chart survey to approximately 500 stores and brought in 
barcode scanners to monitor record sales. Chart return shops nevertheless continued to 
be targeted.  
Throughout this period, the incompleteness of the survey had considerable 
effects. Although many singles were hyped, the success of some genres was overlooked, 
as was the output of smaller record labels and specialist record shops (Stanley 2013: 
596). Significant sales of reggae and Asian records took place in localized stores that did 
not provide chart returns. Consequently, the popularity of this music was not accurately 
reflected in the Top 40. There were also chart rules stating that sales needed to be 
registered across retailers from around the country (Cope 1999: 91). As a result, the 
regional hits of independent labels were hampered.  
It was only in the 1990s, when a particular aspect of barcode technology came to 
the fore, that the hyping of chart return shops was reduced. The larger record chains 
introduced the practice of centralized buying, whereby their head offices would use 
barcode data from sales to order stock for an entire chain of shops. As a result, the 
effectiveness of targeting individual retailers was negated (Negus 1992: 129). In the 
twenty-first century, it has been eliminated completely. This is in part because the vast 
majority shops now provide chart data: the Official Chart Company claims to document 
the sales of ‘15,000-plus chart-reporting retailers, who together represent an estimated 
99% of the singles market’ (Official Charts 2019a). It is also because physical retail 
constitutes an insignificant element of singles ‘sales’.  
 The Official Charts Company first incorporated download sales figures into its 
main singles chart in 2005, and has included information from streaming companies 
since 2014. In turn, these digital formats have come to dominate the charts. With their 
arrival, the practice of manipulating sales figures (or ‘sales equivalent’ figures, in the 
case of streaming) has lessened. It has not been eliminated entirely, though. There have 
been reports of people setting up false streaming accounts to register multiple plays for 
artists. Some of this activity is coming from ‘superfans’, who are attempting to raise the 
profile of their favourite artists (Montgomery 2018). Elsewhere, artists and record 
companies are employing ‘streaming farms’ to generate millions of plays for particular 
songs (Ingham 2018). These digital platforms have in addition raised new questions 
about the breadth of the survey. They have a worldwide span. Thus, it has been claimed 
that it is ‘a genuine possibility that a global chart, pushed by the major record 
companies and adopted by these “gatekeepers”, could become a bigger priority than 
local equivalent charts’ (Lambot 2015: 9). 
 
How are the figures represented? 
Billboard has presented the main American singles chart as a ‘Hot 100’ since 1958. In 
Britain, the number of songs listed has varied and expanded with time. The original 
NME chart detailed twelve titles; the current Official Charts Company chart lists the 
hundred most popular singles. There has nevertheless been continuity and 
correspondence in the printed or online display of the figures. The published charts in 
both countries place the number one single at the top; the bottom placed song is at the 
bottom. Beyond this there is little to distinguish the representation of each individual 
title. The top singles might be given a bit more space than those below, but only to a 
marginal extent. In addition, the only numbers provided are the order of preference. 
The charts do not publicly document a record’s sales figures. 
 This presentation masks considerable differences between the chart positions. 
The charts in Britain and America have various cut-off points, the most important of 
which is the split between the Top 40 singles and those below. Although this division is 
not marked in the charts themselves, it has traditionally been at this point that media 
companies’ most significant promotional activity has kicked in. This number is also 
utilized by record companies, who recognize a Top 40 position as a marker for the 
success of a record, as well as a trigger for the resources they will commit to an act. 
There are further cut-off points within the Top 40. A new level of promotional activity 
will ensue in if the single reaches number 30 or above. This process redoubles as the 
chart numbers ascend, reaching a climax with the number one record, which receives 
considerably more media and record company attention than any other chart position. 
There is something curious about this process. The companies influence the way the 
charts work, but then allow the charts to influence their own working practices.  
The statistical dispersion is reflected in sales. In Britain, the number one record 
will regularly sell double the amount of the single below. The same is true of the top ten 
singles in relation to the singles from eleven to twenty, and of the top twenty when 
compared with singles in positions from 21 to 40 (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 2012). The 
music industries have nevertheless chosen to mask the differences between these 
numbers, presenting the charts as a ‘Top 40 democracy’ (Weisbard 2014) and 
promoting a ‘false equivalence’ between its songs (Laing 1969: 28). This suits their dual 
purpose of using the charts as a marketing tool for new material, which will gain its 
most important fillip as long as it reaches the top 40, as well for ensuring that 
blockbuster releases achieve maximum returns.  
 The presentation of the numbers has further effects. Most countries have an 
array of singles charts, covering different sectors of their markets. Yet they differ in the 
attention that they give to each chart and in the way their charts relate to one another: 
they are shaped by the political economies of national music industries and in turn help 
to shape them. Looking at America, for example, we can see how the country’s scale and 
diversity is reflected in its charts. Billboard’s Hot 100 offers a broad overview of the 
popularity of recordings, but the trade journal also publishes significant minority 
charts, which are demographically and regionally based. Historically, the most notable 
have been the rhythm and blues chart (which has detailed the popularity of records 
among African-American audiences) and the country chart (which first tabulated this 
music’s popularity in the southern states from which it hailed). These charts, along with 
others such as the Latin chart and the gospel chart, have commanded considerable 
attention. They have acted as barometers, taking the measure of discreet markets of 
American music. They have also been the source of ‘cross-over’ singles, records that 
have come to fruition in one sector but have then been promoted in other charts. An 
ideal has been to ‘break’ a hit in a minority chart and then work it towards the Hot 100. 
In fact, this is why the Billboard chart features one hundred songs. According to Ernest 
A. Hakanen, ‘it expanded many times in the 1950s to accommodate primarily the 
crossover market’ (1998: 105). 
 The UK also has a number of singles charts, addressing different formats, genres, 
regions and business practices. The national singles chart is more dominant and 
immediate than its American equivalent, however. The niche charts have rarely 
operated as sources for it. Instead, for those with commercial ambition, the ‘official’ 
singles chart has been their target from the first. It has provided the major record labels 
with their main means of promoting new acts and new music. They have worked in sync 
with media companies and retailers to ensure this chart works quickly and effectively. 
Music journals such as Melody Maker (in the 1960s), NME (in the 1970s and 1990s) and 
Smash Hits (1978-2006) have let the Top 40 dictate their editorial decisions. The charts 
have similarly shaped (and been shaped by) the playlists of the BBC’s national youth 
radio station, Radio 1(1967-present), and the selection policy of its most viewed music 
programme, Top of the Pops (1964-2006). High street record retailers have put the Top 
40 countdown of the singles chart on prominent display. As well as providing a pull for 
UK record companies, this concentrated promotional activity has attracted interest 
from abroad. Writing in the early 1990s, Keith Negus documented how success in 
Britain was being ‘used as a lever to negotiate the release of material in other 
territories’ (1992: 11). The UK charts ‘set the agenda for record companies and radio 
stations across Europe’, while American labels sought ‘British success as part of their 
global strategies rather than simply to gain more sales’ (ibid.).  
It has been argued that the British are ‘more interested in charts than any other 
nation’ (Jones 2002: 3) and that the singles chart has ‘a special appeal to the British 
sensibility’ (Stanley 2013: 3). It is not for everyone, however. While there are record 
companies, artists and audiences who regard the chart as the apex of their musical 
world, there are others who have viewed the Top 40 as something to kick against. At 
times this chart has been so pervasive that the market has bifurcated around it. Its most 
successful rival has tabulated independent singles. The independent chart first emerged 
in the polarized 1980s. Tellingly, it has not operated on a regional basis and nor has it 
been used as a feeder for the main chart. It has instead monitored the means of 
production. If you are ‘independent’ of the major labels you are in; if you are signed or 
distributed by them, you are not. The usefulness of this chart has been debated. There 
are those within the independent scene who have purposefully sought escape from the 
Top 40; there are others who have not wanted to become ghettoized from the 
commercial centre of British musical life.  
 
How frequent are the charts? 
It has been a recurring feature of singles charts around the world that they are 
tabulated weekly. This accords with the rhythms of commercial life: retailers make 
singles available on a set day of the week; they reach peak points of sales according to 
daily shopping patterns. This policy is not without its effects. Martin Talbot, the chief 
executive of The Official Charts Company, has noted ‘If the public don’t like the record, it 
won’t go to number one. If they like it, and the conditions are right. The sales come in 
over the right span [...] the planets have aligned’ (‘How to Make a Number One Record’ 
2015). The key words here are ‘over the right span’. The weekly charts are biased 
towards records that can achieve popularity in a limited time period. This clearly 
favours the singles that are being promoted most heavily, as well as artists who have 
the most dedicated sets of fans. The weekly tally has had a further distorting effect. A hit 
record will have to sell fewer copies to reach the top of the charts in the summer than it 
will in the Christmas period. Record companies organize their release schedules 
accordingly, promoting their newer artists in quieter periods and saving major releases 
for the weeks of blockbuster sales. These phenomena were most notable when the 
charts were concentrated upon physical product. As we shall see, the larger record 
companies had means of getting consumers to buy chosen records at the most apposite 
time. Meanwhile, the task of creating a hit was harder for those with smaller budgets. As 
Parker has noted, a weekly chart ‘discriminates against minority musics in an 
apparently democratic fashion’ (1991: 208).  
 Previously, chart weeks were marked by space as well as by time. Recordings 
were released in different territories at different times and on different days. The charts 
are now more global. The span of the Internet has meant that recordings released in one 
territory but not in another are liable to be pirated. The industry’s solution has been to 
launch ‘New Music Fridays’, a worldwide correspondence of release dates, which was 
first established in 2015.1 This initiative was opposed by smaller and more localized 
record labels, who feared that it would lead to a homogenization of the world’s charts. 
Martin Mills, chairman of the Beggars Group, predicted that the resultant ‘lack of 
diversity will strangle innovation and music will become moribund and uninteresting, 
and consumer interest will erode. It will also dis-empower the artist, since the major 
labels will regain total control of access to market. It will create short-termism, and 
damage career longevity’ (Cooke 2015).  
The results have been mixed. On the one hand, international artists are now 
responsible for a higher proportion of chart hits. In 2016, they claimed 95 per cent of 
the top ten most streamed tracks in the UK (the remaining five per cent was due to ‘This 
is What You Came For’, a collaboration between the British artist Calvin Harris and the 
Barbadian singer Rihanna) (Ingham 2017a). On the other hand, the concept of 
                                                     
1 A similar initiative is ‘on air/on sale’, which was launched in the summer of 2015. Where 
tracks were previously broadcast ahead of their release date, they are now made available 
to download or stream at the same time they issued to radio. While this initiative combats 
piracy, it clashes with British record companies’ policy of using pre-release broadcasts to 
build pent-up demand. It has also been viewed as a contributory factor in the slowing down 
of the chart. In response a ‘feeder’ chart has been introduced in the UK. This ‘trending chart’ 
aims to identify ‘those new artists showing most growth and greatest momentum’ 
(Williamson 2016: 4). 
 
‘international’ has become broader. Mills’ fears appear to have been sparked by 
Americanization, but some of the biggest selling singles are now by Latin artists. 
 Turning full circle, downloads and streams have not only affected the geography 
of the singles chart, they have also raised questions about time. Rather than collating 
data and reporting it on a weekly basis, it is now possible to have a continual update of 
sales and usage. As such, there have been suggestions that the charts should be more 
frequent. This has been realized in America, where Rolling Stone launched daily updated 
charts in 2019. In Britain, details can be gained about mid-week chart positions but the 
official chart remains weekly. This has been defended as being in the national interest. 
Talbot has stated, ‘we have 60 years of heritage: there have been more than 1,200 
Number 1 singles. If the chart was changing day-by-day, you could multiply that by 19. 
It dilutes how special it is for an artist to take the crown’ (Anon. 2012: 14). 
 
What counts as a ‘single’? 
Billboard’s Hot 100 always reached beyond sales, as it incorporated radio play from the 
first. Aligned with America’s commercial broadcasting system this meant radio stations 
were the major target of hyping activity. The trade journal married together sales 
figures and broadcast figures by weighting each component in the chart. Using the same 
technique, Billboard has found it relatively easy to incorporate streaming information 
into the Hot 100. They have included data from audio streaming services since 2012, 
and from YouTube since 2013. In that year Billboard’s average weighting was 35-45 per 
cent of the chart tally for physical and digital sales, 30-40 per cent for airplay 
information, and 20-30 per cent for streaming data (Trust 2013). In contrast, the UK 
charts have been focused solely on sales. As a result, the Official Charts Company has 
found the incorporation of streaming data problematic both technically and 
conceptually.  
 The attempts to reconcile streaming with chart criteria have garnered 
considerable attention, but this masks the fact that there has long been flexibility and 
manipulation regarding what constitutes a ‘single’. In the earliest years of the UK charts, 
some compilers listed the two sides of a single separately, while others incorporated 
separate cover versions within a single chart entry. The first charts also documented 
hits rather than singles per se. In the 1950s and early 1960s, most of the records sold 
were singles, but some artists also achieved significant album sales. Frank Sinatra was 
the most notable, and in 1956 his Songs for Swingin’ Lovers collection became a top ten 
hit in these ‘combined’ charts. The same feat was realized by some of the Beatles’ early 
albums. Nevertheless, as overall album sales increased it gradually became established 
that there should be separate charts for singles and albums. In addition, the idea of a 
‘single’ coalesced so that in chart terms they were equated with physical products by 
individual acts: the b-side formed part of the chart placing; the cover version did not.  
 This did not mean that chart rules were fixed for all time. They have been 
expanded to accommodate other singles formats. Twelve-inch singles were included in 
the chart in 1983, and cassette singles and CD singles by the end of the 1980s. A ‘single’ 
chart entry, therefore, has not been made up of a single product. Instead, various 
formats have been collated to establish the result. There have been differing rules about 
the extent to which these formats should resemble each other. For example, it was 
originally stipulated that a twelve-inch single should have the same tracks as its seven-
inch equivalent. There has also been flexibility. It later became acknowledged that, as 
long as the formats share a ‘lead’ track, it would be possible to have various b-sides and 
remixes across the different versions of a single. Restrictions have remained, 
nonetheless. The Official Chart Company rules for July 2019 stipulate that a seven-inch 
single can have no more than three different songs and must be under 25 minutes 
duration; a twelve-inch single or CD single is limited to four different songs and must be 
under 25 minutes; a ‘remix’ single can have any number of remixes of the lead title, but 
must be under 40 minutes duration (Official Charts 2019b). 
Following the 1980s introduction of barcode data as the source for chart 
information, record companies used multi-formatting as a means to hype records into 
the Top 40. They could increase sales of a single by issuing it in as many versions as 
possible, having realized that some dedicated fans would purchase every iteration of a 
release. Multi-formatting was also used to sustain a single’s chart success. One of the 
reasons why Frankie Goes to Hollywood’s ‘Two Tribes’ remained at number one for 
nine weeks in 1984 was because new twelve-inch versions were regularly being issued. 
This practice was viewed as getting out of hand, with some singles being released in ten 
or more editions. Chart rules were subsequently introduced that reduced the number of 
eligible formats: record companies were restricted to five in 1991, then four a few years 
later, and then three physical formats in 1994.  
 Singles have also been defined by their cost. Chart compilers have established 
rules about the minimum dealer price of a record. The July 2019 guidelines have these 
at 40 pence for a download, 50 pence for a seven-inch single, £1.79 for a CD single and 
£1.99 for a twelve-inch single (Official Charts 2019b). There have also been criteria 
about minimum retail price. For example, the independent singles issued by Crass in the 
1980s were ruled out of chart contention because they were deemed to be too cheap 
(Stanley 2013: 312). BPI later changed its tune about this policy, lifting any restrictions 
on retail price (bar free product). This was in response to the major record companies’ 
demands.  
In the 1990s a new method hyping was adopted. Singles would be priced cheaply 
in the first few weeks of release (often at half the recommended retail price and thus 
selling at a loss) and would sometimes include limited edition free gifts (records that 
include gifts of posters, cards and/or stickers remain eligible for the charts). Record 
companies would issue these singles to broadcasters for radio play well ahead of their 
release dates. These tactics prompted fans to purchase records as soon as they were 
issued, ideally with the effect of forcing them into the charts. With these means the 
record industry was able to influence purchasing behaviour so that singles would enter 
at high chart positions, including at number one. This was not without consequences. 
Bob Stanley has noted how this ‘looked very impressive in theory, but it just meant that 
people were losing interest in the chart because the charts weren’t a consensus of what 
the country was listening to or what the country liked’ (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 2012).  
This practice reached a climax in the year 2000, when the UK chart featured 43 
separate number one singles, all of which entered at the top. This marketing practice, 
coupled with the onset of file-sharing, led to a decline in sales of singles. Across the 
whole of 2004, only 32 million singles were sold, the lowest annual figure. In 2005, the 
re-release of Elvis Presley’s ‘One Night’ reached number one selling just 20,463 copies, 
whereas in the 1980s a number one single would regularly sell ten times that amount 
(McLean 2005). The policy had an effect on the television chart show Top of the Pops, 
which since the 1970s had been the music industry’s most valuable asset for promoting 
singles sales. According to BBC producer Trevor Dann, ‘The old dynamic of the chart, 
where records entered low and rose, peaked and then fell, changed completely. Every 
number one was a new record and that meant that Top Of The Pops was not playing big 
hits, it was playing new releases’ (Evans 2016: 259). Audiences for the show dwindled, 
leading to its cancellation in 2006. 
This might be considered poor timing, as by this point the chart was 
incorporating downloads. The inclusion of this format boosted sales (189 million 
singles were sold in 2012, the highest annual figure) and was viewed as restoring the 
health of the Top 40. Downloads have rarely been sold to the public at discount prices 
and they do not include free gifts. Thus, as their contribution to the charts grew in 
importance, it made the record companies’ pricing and promotional practices 
somewhat redundant. Consequently, the charts slowed down.  
 Compared with streaming, downloads were relatively easy to incorporate into 
the chart. Download singles are bought individually and their sales can be tabulated. In 
this sense they can be equated with physical singles. There were some hurdles to 
overcome before they could receive chart recognition, nevertheless. A lead track on a 
physical single is distinguished from a track on an album. It is given its own packaging, 
price and targeted promotion. It will also probably have limited availability: from the 
1980s onwards it became standard practice that singles would be deleted shortly after 
they exited the charts (and sometimes before they did). In contrast, a downloading 
platform is full of ‘single’ songs, but there is little means to distinguish a song that is 
planned as a single from one that is an album track. There is also little to distinguish 
new songs from old songs. The Official Charts Company fought against this. When 
downloads were first incorporated in the chart there was a stipulation that for songs to 
qualify they must contemporaneously be issued as a physical single. However, as 
downloads came to dominate the Top 40 – by the first three months of 2006 they had 
come represent 88.7 per cent of all single sales (Williams 2007: 12) – the idea of 
releasing physical singles became less desirable. In response, the industry allowed itself 
to drop this chart ruling. 
In January 2007 all download tracks were made eligible for the charts. This 
meant that any song of any age could be a single. Old songs entered the Top 40, 
including Rage Against the Machine’s ‘Killing in the Name’, which reached number one 
in 2009 on the back of an anti-X Factor crowd-funding campaign. In general, these 
developments were viewed positively. The music journalist Miranda Sawyer argued, 
‘the charts are good again; with the resurgence of the single and downloads now being 
counted, there are climbers and non-movers and novelty tracks (2006). Reggie Yates, 
who was responsible for the chart countdown show on Radio 1 from 2007 until 2012, 
claimed that the charts had become ‘important’ once more (‘Pop Charts Britannia’ 
2012).  
 Streaming, in contrast, has been regarded as diminishing the value of the chart. 
Reflecting some awareness of the problems to come, the chart compilers approached 
this format with notable reluctance. Spotify was launched in Britain in 2008, but audio 
streams were not incorporated into the charts until 2014. Talbot claimed that ‘Because 
of the nature and the status of the Official Singles Chart here in the UK, with its 60 years 
of history and its cultural heritage, it wasn’t something we could rush into’ (McGuinness 
2014). The main numerical difficulty was how to equate a stream with a sale. A ratio of 
100:1 was eventually adopted. This was justified on the grounds that a single download 
would generate the same royalties for rights holders as one hundred streams. The 
Official Charts Company was cognizant of the fact that different streaming tiers deliver 
different royalty rates, but chose ‘a blended rate’ averaging out the royalties for 
subscription and ad-funded services (Anon. 2014: 1).  
The main theoretical problem was how to move from a chart based solely on 
exchange to one that includes a focus on use. The issue here was not that sales provide a 
more accurate reflection of taste than streams do (after all, streaming details the 
employment of a song, whereas buying a single does not guarantee it will be played). 
Conversely, it was not felt that quantifying sales should be abandoned as being inferior 
(it can be argued that the purchase of a single is indicative of a commitment to music, 
whereas streaming gives no indication of a listener’s investment in a song). Instead, the 
public debate centred on the awkwardness of placing these two forms of quantification 
together. The record companies, meanwhile, had a different concern. What was most 
problematic for them was a shift in the chart’s utility. They had valued the chart less as a 
measure of popularity than as a guide to consumerism. An exchange has been useful for 
them because it tabulates newness; ideally the engagement of a new consumer with a 
new product. In contrast, a usage chart is statistically biased towards re-use; it details 
the same consumers listening to the same old songs. It is therefore less effectual for the 
industry’s promotional and marketing campaigns.  
This became apparent as streaming became dominant in the chart. Because there 
is no weighting in the British system, it could quickly displace other formats. In early 
2014, before streaming was incorporated, downloads were responsible for 99.5 per 
cent of chart activity (McGuinness 2014). Immediately afterwards, streaming activity 
made up half of the chart, and within a year it constituted the vast majority of ‘sales’. It 
was a blockbuster release that highlighted how things had changed. In the summer of 
2016, Drake’s ‘One Dance’ remained at number one for fifteen weeks. Its longevity 
demonstrated wider trends: the Top 40 was slowing down and was featuring fewer new 
releases (Sutherland 2017b: 1). Although the chart had once been engineered to reduce 
the rate of change, people now complained that it was ‘stagnating’ and had become 
‘sluggish and dull’ (Sutherland 2017a: 12; Jones 2016).  
Playlists were held responsible. Identified by streaming companies as their 
distinguishing feature, they were accounting for 58 per cent of their listeners’ activity 
by March 2017 (Mulligan 2016; Mulligan 2017). According to critics, it has not been the 
general public that determines playlist consumption, but instead the streaming 
companies’ ‘editors’ (Sutherland 2016a: 1). The resulting listening experience has been 
deemed to be ‘passive’ (Ingham 2017b). Moreover, the streaming companies have 
agreed that they are ‘presenting’ music to the public:  
 
Most people in the world are passive listeners. They don’t actively seek new 
music. They do not read music blogs. They hardly listen to radio. They don’t read 
music magazines. They don’t share music and they like being spoon-fed. What 
they are listening to just so happens because they are listening to it. (Anonymous 
Spotify employee, quoted in Sun 2019: 157, 158) 
 
Playlists have been blamed for ‘the lack of new artist breakthroughs’ and ‘the stagnation 
of the chart’, as well as ‘UK music being superseded by America’ (Sutherland 2016b: 
12). Facing the need to speed up the Top 40, the first response of the Official Charts 
Company was to rebalance its ratios. In January 2017 it was decided that 150 streams 
would now equate to one sale.  
Streaming growth remained exponential. Despite this new ratio, its overall 
contribution to the chart still increased, accounting for 85 per cent of all calculations 
within six months (Sutherland 2017b: 1). Consequently, a further measure was 
introduced. In June 2017, it was stipulated that if a single had been in the charts for ten 
weeks, it would be made subject to ‘accelerated decline’. Thereafter, if the single 
experienced three consecutive weeks of diminishing popularity, its stream to sale ratio 
would be increased to 300:1. Talbot stated, ‘This is all about supporting new music. 
We’re making sure the chart continues to be a place that reflects the consumption of 
new records in a fast-changing world’ (Sutherland 2017b: 1).  
 At the same time, the Official Charts Company tackled a separate issue, which 
was highlighted by another blockbuster release. When Ed Sheeran’s album Divide was 
released in March 2017, all sixteen of its tracks made the singles top twenty, nine of 
them in the top ten. Sheeran proved that new releases could still have an impact on the 
charts, but for some this only served to illustrate the extent to which the charts were 
‘broken’ (Mulligan 2017). It was suggested that the Ed Sheeran phenomenon was the 
result of including streaming data, but it in fact had its roots in an earlier decision. 
Streaming was incorporated in the charts in the same manner as downloads: all songs 
were eligible, regardless of their age or whether they had been promoted as single. This 
was no longer viewed as being fit for purpose. To ensure that individual performers 
would not clog up the charts, it was decided in June 2017 that in any given week only 
the three most popular ‘singles’ of any given artist would be allowed space in the Top 
100. With this measure there was a return to the idea that a single was a bespoke object, 
albeit that singles were being determined by their popularity, and not necessarily 
because they had been chosen by the industry. 
Further tinkering ensued. An argument was put forth that subscription streams 
should be valued more highly than ad-supported streams. This was on two grounds. 
First, it was claimed that paying subscribers were somehow more attentive than those 
who listened to streaming services for free (Ingham 2017b). Second, it was argued that 
the industry gains more income from subscription services. Therefore, if streaming 
ratios were supposed to reflect royalty payments, the ‘blended rate’ should be replaced 
with separate calculations for different types of streams. In June 2018 it was decided 
that the rate for subscription services would be 100 streams to one sale, whereas for ad-
supported it would be 600:1. The ‘accelerated decline’ figures were recalibrated 
accordingly: subscription services would be quantified at 200:1, while the ad-supported 
ratio would be 1200:1.  
There are a number of curious aspects to these developments. One is the fact that 
they were so openly discussed. In the past there had been a desire that the compilation 
of the Top 40 appear ‘natural’ to consumers. There was little mention of statistical 
methodology and amendments to rules were considered a trade concern only. The 
incorporation of streaming into the charts made public the idea that they must operate 
in the interests of the national music industries. Following on from this, changes to 
methodology have become more frequent. As it has become accepted practice that the 
charts can be manipulated, this has liberated the compilers to make repeated changes to 
get the balance right. The third development is more reactionary. One of the oddities 
about the solutions to these digital problems is the extent to which they are rooted in 
the physical past. Where the acceptance of streaming data used to be broad and open, 
single tracks are now distinguished from album tracks. In addition, the industry cannot 
stop equating value with money. The problem of passive streaming has been blamed 
upon playlist culture, a practice that exists across both subscription and ad-supported 
tiers. However, this is not where the chart compilers have looked for a remedy. Instead, 
listening for free is regarded as being six times less important than paying for a service.2  
                                                     
2 Music business analyst Mark Mulligan has offered a twist on this development. He argues 
that the record companies’ concentration upon playlists means that casual listeners are now 
more economically important than engaged listeners, leading to the production of music 
that is ‘creatively bankrupt’ (Mulligan 2019). In order to reorient the industry towards 
committed listeners and creative artists, Mulligan suggests that royalty rates should be 
reduced for playlist streams. The question that follows on from this is whether a parallel 
penalization of playlists could offer a statistical salve for the ‘broken’ charts. 
This outlook has coloured one of the latest developments in the UK charts. Data 
from YouTube was first incorporated in July 2018. The reason given for its previous 
exclusion was that YouTube was not a member of ERA and therefore not eligible for the 
chart. There was also concern that YouTube data would not be the sort to keep the chart 
alive. This service is free to access; the motivations for viewing a video are not clear; it 
contains unlicensed material; its content is international rather than localized; and it is 
enormously popular. The final factor was the one that was most feared. Globally, 
YouTube provides the main means for consuming music; it has the ultimate capacity to 
transform local charts. This popularity also provides the reason why the Official Charts 
Company had to come to terms with YouTube data at some point: if it had failed to do so 
the chart could have been considered irrelevant. The acceptance is only partial, 
however. The Official Charts Company accepts data from ‘official’ video platforms (that 
is, licensed material from recognized record companies). User-generated content does 
not contribute to the chart. In addition, YouTube content is penalized in the same 
manner as other ad-supported audio streams. It is calibrated at one sixth of the value of 
subscription services. It will not be a surprise if this ratio is ratcheted up further if the 
distorting pull of YouTube begins to be felt.  
 
Exiting the chart 
The singles chart is not broken because it has never been fixed. It is mutable and at no 
point has it offered a straightforward presentation of the public’s preference for 
recordings. Record companies have manipulated it. They have falsified sales and bent 
the rules. The chart has symbols that swing.3 The public has manipulated the chart too. 
                                                     
3 A sign of the centrality of the singles charts to British life is the redolence of the theme 
music that has been employed for radio and television chart shows. Popular music fans of 
They may have fallen prey to the record companies’ promotional strategies, buying into 
the popularity of records that have been hyped, lapping up multi-formats and rushing 
out to purchase cut-price singles on the day of release. But one of the reasons why they 
bought these records is because they wanted their favourite acts to be promoted. There 
was a desire to hear them on the radio, read about them in the music press and watch 
them on Top of the Pops. If they got them into the charts then this could happen.  
 This leads us to something that has been broken. The UK singles chart used to 
matter. But this was not because it documented what had already happened with a 
single, but instead because it triggered what would come next. There was a link 
between a single’s chart position and the level of attention it would go on to receive. 
There was a system of mediators who would know what to do with it. It is this 
relationship that has been severed. The Official Charts Company may well find a formula 
that will make the rhythm of streaming consumption match their desired rhythm for the 
chart. What they will find harder to restore is the dynamic spark that a Top 40 chart 
placing used to provide. Record retailers have long since given up displaying the singles 
chart; there is no music journal that is tied in to it; radio broadcasters are no longer 
attuned to a Top 40 ideal. Streaming companies such as Spotify and YouTube are in fact 
the main mediators of their own hits. This means that when a song receives a high chart 
placing there is little impact for the consumer. The song will already be on the 
streaming company’s playlists and its video will already have been viewed. If the singles 
chart has lost its significance it is because it is now doing the job that it originally 
purported to do. It no longer drives the popularity of music; it merely reflects it.  
                                                     
certain ages will be familiar with ‘Yellow Pearl’ by Phil Lynott or the CCS version of ‘Whole 
Lotta Love’. ‘At the Sign of the Swingin’ Cymbals’ by Brian Fahey and his Orchestra was one 
the earliest and most evocative themes. It sound-tracked the chart countdown for Alan 
Freeman’s ‘Pick of the Pops’ on the BBC Light Programme from 1961 to 1966.   
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